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Abstract
This paper deals with issues related to management of industrial research. The
overall research question is how industrial researchers can be managed to
increase the company’s benefits. The relevance of this question is put into
perspective by two main considerations. On the one hand, it is widely recognized
that individual researchers should possess a high level of autonomy to preserve
the ability of research to renew itself. On the other hand, companies need to
maintain control over that freedom to develop their research activities in a long-
term company perspective.
The paper contributes to a deeper understanding of the management of industrial
research by moving the focus from risk management and portfolio planning
(decision and control based management) to management in situations marked by
high uncertainty and asymmetric distribution of information (management of
self-governing systems). More specifically, the evolutionary perspective on
individual adaptation is used in combination with evolutionary economics to
create an analytical framework for understanding managerial action in industrial
research. This framework, is used to explain how managers can try to increase
the probability that individual research processes create results, which eventually
increase the fit of the company to its environment. It is argued that research
managers can, to a certain extent, influence the complex processes of individual
adaptation by influencing individual decision making through a) setting and
communicating research specific goals and b) creating and maintaining shared
cognitive frames.
3Introduction
Research based companies have for long recognized the need for managerial
influence on the research process. Since the decline of the linear growth model in
the late 1960s (Coombs 1996, Hounshell 1996) various models for allocating
limited resources to create most value for the company have been developed and
tested. In the 1970s and 1980s the linear growth model was succeeded by a
management approach with emphasis on risk reduction through strong
management influence on the research process and orientation toward the needs
of today’s customers (Hounshell 1996, Roussel et al. 1991, Rosenbloom and
Spencer 1996). Although the project portfolio planning approach proofs to be
efficient in delivering results according to time-schedules, it also suffers from
serious shortcomings; the focus on reaching predictable ends pushes industrial
research toward low risk incremental projects. In this case the results primarily
support the short-term activities but hardly have a strategic impact and value for
the firm. The main concern in the research management literature in the 1990s is
to balance the two considerations (Randle and Currie 1996, Rostrup-Nielsen et
al. 1997, Husted 1998). On the one hand, it is widely recognized that individual
researchers should possess a high level of autonomy to preserve the ability of
research to renew itself. On the other hand, companies need to maintain control
over that freedom to develop their research activities in a long-term company
perspective.
This paper argues that besides creativity also other factors like complexity, rate
of change, uncertainty combined with an asymmetric distribution of knowledge
between research management and researchers make it necessary to allow for a
high degree of autonomy in research. However, autonomy does not inevitably
imply that individual research processes and decisions are beyond managerial
influence. Drawing upon an evolutionary perspective on individual adaptation in
a nested hierarchy this paper develops an analytical framework for understanding
the role of research management in a largely self-governing autonomous system.
The paper first treats the subject of the simultaneous need for control and
autonomy in research. It then briefly introduces the evolutionary perspective on
adaptation in a nested hierarchy and the following management understanding.
Based on this the paper develops a framework for analyzing managerial action in
self-governing system as industrial research. Within this framework, the paper
suggests that management has to deal with following three issues when designing
organizations or processes within organizations as adaptive systems: 1) influence
individual decisions, 2) selecting and rewarding among contributions and giving
feedback from the selection process and 3) designing the internal research
environment. The focus then narrows to discussing the first of the proposed
design parameters - how management can influence individual decision-making
with the aim of increasing the corporate value of sponsoring research.
4The stage for institutional control and individual autonomy
High uncertainty is a basic condition for decision-making in research. The
processes of science, technology and innovation are interacting and iterative
processes embedded in multidimensional uncertainty (Kline and Rosenberg
1986; Vincenti 1990). The uncertainty concerns 1) the character of output from
the knowledge creating process (research often answers other questions than
intended (Stephan 1996)), 2) timing in terms of when the results might come, 3)
what benefit/value creation they might give rise to. Serious decisions often have
to be made at an early stage of R&D projects where uncertainty is especially high
and the possibility of obtaining relevant information for making decisions is
limited. Decision-making in research is, moreover, characterized by a two-way
asymmetric distribution of knowledge between individual researchers and
management.
On the one hand, the individual researcher knows more about the potential of his
or her field than managers do. This means that the researcher is better prepared
for making decisions on a continuos basis about what activities to take up, what
methods to apply, how to interpret the results in the research process, what new
opportunities should be pursued, when and how to disclose results and to who
etc. On the other hand, research managers often possess a more detailed
understanding of the company’s needs and competitive environment. Under these
basic conditions of uncertainty and asymmetric distribution of knowledge and
information, decision-making in research has to reflect a wide range of
considerations, sometimes acting in opposite directions.
Another important aspect of research and similar knowledge creating activities in
both private and public R&D organisations is that they increasingly take place in
and are shaped by close interactions with their environment. Gibbons et al.
(1994) label this “Mode II” and point out that besides being increasingly
interdisciplinary in nature, the knowledge creating process is to a greater extent
shaped through the interaction with both upstream and downstream users and the
political level. This issue is also addressed by the so-called “triple helix” concept
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1998).
Industrial research is expected to create innovative and relevant knowledge for
the firm’s future ability for adapting to its business environment. Decisions made
in research are often decisive for the future of research based companies since
they form the basis for the companies’ future competitiveness and set the agenda
for future corporate interpretation of the environment and the possible actions.
Because of the vital role in designing the future ground for the company’s
competitiveness, industrial research is more than other corporate activities about
preparing for, reckoning with and building futures (van Lente 1994). In order to
meet this responsibility decision-making in research must depend on and be
guided through anticipation of changes in the complex and dynamic environment
e.g. progress or setbacks in competing and complementary external research
activities, government regulation, and changes in customers’ preferences and
needs in the market.
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responsible for harvesting from these competencies by constantly monitoring the
business environment for imminent changes to which research can mount an
adaptive response (Mort 1994). Results from research is often related with
considerable scope advantages (Cristensen 1998, Henderson and Cockburn
1993), where knowledge developed with a specific purpose in mind opens up for
a wide range of unexpected applications in e.g. new product or processes. An
asymmetric distribution of knowledge between top-management, market oriented
staff and research management on the one side and the researchers who create the
knowledge on the other side implies that these unexpected opportunities cannot
be detected by other than the researchers themselves. Besides participating in
identification of possible application areas, the difficulties and cost of
transferring knowledge from research to development force industrial researchers
to put a considerable effort in the dissemination and application of knowledge in
development of new or improved products and processes.
Lately, the importance of access to external knowledge has achieved increased
attention mainly because of the accelerating need for applying multidisciplinary
approaches in industrial research. Cohen and Levinthal (1990) suggest that the
ability of a firm to recognise the value of new, external knowledge, to assimilate
it, and to apply it to internal purposes is one of the most important benefits from
funding internal research. However, it is far from sufficient to posses the needed
absorptive capacity in order to create value from new external knowledge. The
value for the company of accessing external knowledge is highly dependent on:
a) that the relevant external knowledge can be access as early as possible
preferably before it is disclosed for wider audience and
b) access to the related often tacit knowledge directly from the source.
This kind of access to knowledge works on quid pro quit basis (Hicks 1995),
which implies that industrial research must besides being willing to share its
knowledge, produce competitive new knowledge and hence coordinate the
choice of activities with the priorities of the network it wants to access. All
decisions have to be based on the insights of individual researchers because
research management:
1) does not possess the needed very detailed knowledge about the progress in
specific scientific fields that only can be obtained through ongoing and deep
involvement in field, and
2) might have the formal authority to decide what results to disclose when, but
lacks the needed access to and background for moving the knowledge from
the private domain of individual researchers to a form where it can be shared.
As argued above, factors like complexity, rate of change and uncertainty
combined with a asymmetric distribution of knowledge between research
management and researchers make it necessary to allow for a high degree of
autonomy in research. On the other side, decisions in research often have a
decisive influence on the future of the company and depend on internal systemic
6mechanisms of the company e.g. the actions of suppliers of complementary
competencies (Teece 1988). In other words, companies need to maintain kind of
influence on individual researchers in order to develop their research activities in
a long-term company perspective. The challenge for research management is to
organize autonomous individuals often from different disciplines into a cohesive
group that will meet the company’s objectives.
In the search for an approach suitable for analyzing research management under
these conditions, we can find useful inspiration from scholars working with the
emerging fields of competence and evolutionary theory. They promote the view
that strategic management in firms operating in rapidly changing environments
should be considered as a process of designing organizations as adaptive
systems. Sanches (1997) specifies the objective of this mode of strategic
management as follows: “the objective is creating and supporting self-managing
organizational processes that enables better interpretation of and faster response
to complex, dynamic environments and their attendant uncertainties.”
The following section provides an evolutionary perspective on adaptation in a
nested hierarchy and the role of management. The perspective will be related to
the unique features of decision-making in research with the aim of developing a
framework for analyzing management of research as creating and supporting
self-organizing processes.
Adaptation in a nested hierarchy of evolutionary processes
Dating back to the seminal work of Simon (1962) and Campbell (1960)
evolutionary economists have promoted the idea that the internal flow of
information, interpretation of the business-environment and adaptation take place
in an internal hierarchy of nested evolutionary processes (Aldrich 1979, Miner
1994, Metcalfe and Calerini 1997, Nelson 1991).
The hierarchy ranges from customers’ decision about buying the product at the
top of the hierarchy to individuals considering the value of their ideas at the
bottom of the hierarchy (Randle and Currie 1996). Each level in the hierarchy
constitutes an evolutionary process with selection, variation and rentention. The
hierarchy is nested in the sense that selection criteria on one level in the
hierarchy are subject for selection on a higher level in the hierarchy. From the
adaptation point of view this implies that variants created and selected on one
level are expected to be adapted to higher-level selection criteria and ultimately
to the market. The adaptation on all levels involves a high degree of uncertainty
and is thus far from perfect. Variation on one level does not necessarily
correspond with variation on another level. For example, Gambardella and
Torrisi (1998) found that those electronic firms that simultaneously broaden their
technology base and narrowed their product focus performed better than average
in the industry over the past ten years.
Evolutionary theory deals with the interplay between variety creation and
selection by focusing on changes in variety over time (Frenken et al. 1999). In
7biology, variety is defined as the number of species in a given population. This
narrow definition of variety does not serve the purpose in dealing with
knowledge creation. In knowledge creation every contribution per definition
should be distinguishable from former contributions and represent a new species
itself. A strict biological analogy would imply a simplistic conceptualization of
the relation between knowledge creation and variety. Following the biological
definition of variety, the variety in the knowledge base will increase every time
new knowledge is created. In the present paper variety is perceived as variation
in relation to trajectories of knowledge.
Following this definition, individual adaptation to a shared environment will
result in a high variation in the created knowledge, because of the diversity in
individual interpretation of the environment. According to Dosi and Marengo
1994; Marengo 1992; Metcalfe and Boden 1991 and Witt 1995, the needed
coordination of the individual knowledge creation is achieved by assigning
managers the task of observe and monitor the environment and to communicate
their interpretation to the other members of the organization.
The literature dealing with management from an evolutionary perspective is
mainly focused on strategic issues. Its key concern is the discussion of how to
achieve a suitable alignment between the external selection process at the market
and the internal strategic process that determines which product and processes
the company chooses to compete with on the market. In this perspective the
managerial task is to increase the likelihood that internal processes create
variants adapted to the environment (Metcalfe and Boden 1991, 1993; Meyer
1994, Miner 1994 and Saviotti 1996).
In the core of this evolutionary perspective on management is the assumption
that adaptation is a top-down process. Top management is expected to monitor
the business environment and to foreclose potential directions of development.
When adaptive initiatives are required, the need and conditions are articulated
and communicated through the internal selection environment (Metcalfe and
Boden 1993). Adaptation in a hierarchy takes the form of acceptances of goals,
subgoals, subsubgoals etc. as defined by organizations (Meyer 1994).
Reflecting the general tendency in evolutionary economics the management
understanding suffers from two general problems. First, it is highly focused on
the hierarchical dimension and second, it does not explicitely include
perspectives on management on lower levers in the hierarchy. The issue
concerning a narrow hierarchical focus is thoroughly addressed by Pavitt (1998).
According to him, evolutionary economists put too much emphasis on the
interface between the company and its selection environment through focus on
explaining the economic benefits of technological diversity, on the frequency and
causes of creative destruction expressed in new products and implications of
change in technological paradigms. In order to avoid that evolutionary theory
ends up in the same dead-end as the theories it claims to replace, Pavitt (1998)
invites evolutionary economists to take up the challenge of improving the
understanding of the organizational process of coordination and control of the
8simultaneous, interacting processes of development and application of
technological and scientific knowledge on one hand and commercially successful
working artifacts on the other.
The horizontal dimension is especially important in managing research.
Capturing value from research is highly dependent on the coordination with
interacting and simultaneous processes within the company. As pointed out by
e.g. Metcalfe and Boden (1991), the limits within which a firm can handle
variation as input from research are set by two systemic factors. The first is the
presence or the willingness in the organization to develop the needed
complementary assets for appropriating the rents from the research results
(Helfat 1994 and Teece 1988). Teece suggests that in order to increase the
likelihood that the organization is able to harvest the economical benefits from its
research the research goals should reflect the development in the complementary
assets of the hosting organization. The second is the development in co-
evolutionary processes both internal and external to the hosting organization.
Research and similar knowledge creating activities in both private and public
research organizations increasingly take place in and are shaped by close
interaction with their environment. The dependency of other external knowledge
creation processes is a crucial part of the uncertainty of the decision-makers in
research.
Another weakness of the strategic focus is that it only vaguely indicates how
managerial action on a higher level in the hierarchy is related to managerial
action on lower levels in the hierarchy. Miner (1994) provides an exception by
suggesting that the two primary managerial roles are to 1) adjust the
department’s relationship to higher level evolutionary processes and 2) influence
the internal evolutionary process. However, the main concern in this approach is
to discuss how management can balance the relative weight between variation
and rentention. According to Miner, the continuum of means available for
management to influence the creation of variation ranges from the classic rational
planning paradigm in the one end to a high degree of employee autonomy in the
other end. In the latter one management is not involved in the creation of
variation per se but only in the selection among the created variants.
In the light of the present paper, Miner’s framework lacks an explicit
understanding of how management influences the individual knowledge creation
process leading to new variations despite the high degree of autonomy. This
paper meets the challenge of addressing the issue of managerial action on lower
levels in the hierarchy by taking point of departure in the bottom of the hierarchy
- the process of individual adaptation. On this micro level evolutionary theory
offers an explanation for how knowledge is created and changed under such
conditions of high uncertainty and bounded rationality of the actors (Witt 1995).
Individuals develop new knowledge in order imperfectly to cope with an ever-
changing environment (Dosi and Malerba 1996). The core of individual decision-
making is not a rational choice between alternatives, but the process itself
through which the individual tries to understand his environment by identifying
relevant parameters, interpret these and try to create alternatives adapted to this
9interpretation. In other words, individuals adapt to their environment through
learning.
Vergragt (1988) proposes that research lines and results emerge from actors
making decisions and choices in the learning process. He especially assigns
critical events a major role in forcing actors like researchers to make decisions
about the course to be taken. Critical events include changes or surprises
emerging from both internal and external environments. Internal critical events
appear in the research process when researchers reflect on the accumulated
knowledge, experience and feed back from trial and error search processes.
These reflections often lead to changes in the perceived risk associated with the
project, new opportunities for pursuing other research questions, opportunities to
answer other questions than expected or mere serendipity. Externally induced
critical events include situations when the researcher has lost the race for priority
e.g. because a competitor files a patents application, change in the selection
environment because of changes in markets preferences and prices and
government regulation. Vergragt also includes organizational and strategic
changes at higher hierarchical levels as potential sources of critical events, which
researchers occasionally need to adapt their research process to and reconsider
earlier decisions.
On the basis of two in depth case-studies of the structure of variation Den Hond
(1998) reaches the conclusion that the outcome of innovation processes is highly
dependent on how individuals deal with the constraining factors in the selection
environment. He writes, “trajectories develop under the influence of the
selection environment and when specific search heuristic are applied. How to
proceed is clear, but the results of the innovation process depends on how the
innovator(s) deals with the various, often conflicting, constraining factors in the
selection environment.”
Individual adaptation is driven by the self-interest of the individual. Researchers
often have incentives to select research activities and to make decisions about
their research efforts, which seam most suitable for fulfilling their self-interest in
accumulating rewards for their effort (Husted 1998).
First and foremost, the internal selection and distribution of rewards is the engine
of the individual adaptation processes. The individual researcher does not have
any incentive for adaptation if the internal selection does not function, because
individual adaptation is driven by self-interest of the individual in accumulating
rewards. The rewards in the internal selection need not to be monetary of nature.
On the contrary, several studies indicate that monetary rewards bear a negative
influence on the very processes the are intended to enhance (Kohn 1993, Lawless
and Price 1992). The negative consequences of using monetary reward in
industrial research are discouraging risk-taking and creativity, destroying
cooperation and undermining intrinsic motivation (Randle and Currie 1996). An
alternative to monetary rewards can be found in the priority-based competition
for recognition known from academic science. The priority-based competition
works on the principle that the winner takes it all and that the winner is rewarded
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with recognition from his colleagues adjusted according to the importance of the
contribution. This kind of competition has the positive effects that researchers
tend to make decisions which increase the reward potential relative to his own
abilities and share information in a timely fashion if they want to establish
priority  (Dasgupta and David 1994, Stephan 1996).  More research-based
companies do deliberately take steps to ensure the maintenance of scientific
values in their research departments in order to protect scientific excellence. In
Olin’s Chemical Research management responded to a declining innovativeness
in knowledge creation, by, among other initiatives, establishing a management-
supported reward program for recognition of scientific accomplishments (Marien
1998).
The benefits for industrial research management by setting up and participating
in the internal selection and distribution of reward for achieved results are
obvious. The source of reward is in many respects the source of control over the
direction of research (Hagstrom 1965). In industrial research productivity is not
only a matter of striving for more and better discoveries but of learning how to
create these in a manner and area useful to those who must develop and sell the
eventual products and services (Bosomworth and Sage 1995). An internal
selection environment potentially not only defines the boundaries for individual
research processes but also provide guidance for how the results should be
presented and put into a business perspective.
Summing up, evolutionary theory provides knowledge about the role of learning
in organizations’ adaptation processes and how these learning processes can be
influenced. The adaptation process of an organization to its environment is seen
as a consequence of adaptation in a hierarchy of internal learning processes
(Mckelvey 1996, Miner 1994, Metcalfe and Boden 1993). In this framework
individual adaptation is conscious goal-seeking guided by mental models of the
anticipated future development of the individual’s environment (Silverberg
1988).
An analytical framework for understanding how research management can
manage autonomous individual adaptation processes to increase the overall fit of
the company with its present and especially its future business environment,
includes following three issues:
I. Influencing individual decision-making
II. Selecting and rewarding among contributions and feedback from
selection
III. Designing internal research environment
Figure 1 below illustrates the interplay between the flow of information and the
three means for management to influence individual adaptation processes.
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Research management monitors both the internal and the external environment
for changes, information and knowledge they find relevant for making decisions.
Figure 1: The role of research management as designers of adaptive systems
Individuals use their previous experience knowledge to interpret the input, to
identify alternatives of actions and to select between the alternatives. The gray
zones around research management and researchers illustrate that shared
cognitive frames influence this process. A shared cognitive frame is defined here
as a business conception that helps individuals to interpret what is going on in the
light of the firms overall interest and to associate appropriate actions with the
conceived situation (Witt 1995).
“Learning is local, being highly affected by the cognitive frames and actual
competencies of firms, and is cumulative in that its builds on what has been
already learned” (Dosi and Malerba 1996)
The black arrows illustrate the managerial influence on individual adaptation
processes by: 1) setting goals and creating and maintaining shared cognitive
frames, 2) selection on the actual output from individual research processes
instead of selection on a intentional basis only, and 3) influencing the internal
research environment e.g.by restricting the input for variation by making some
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information easier available than other, investments in instruments and facilities
and setting the stage for  interaction internal of research, with other functions in
the company and external with the research community, customers etc.
The rest of this paper focuses at how research management can influence
individual decision making.
Influencing individual decision making
Autonomy does far from imply that all decisions in industrial research should be
decentralized to the individual or team of researchers. The range of decisions,
which bear influence on which results and how the knowledge is exploited and
research management with benefit can decentralize to individual or team of
researchers  includes decisions regarding:
The research process. When researchers e.g. decide what activities to take up,
which methods to apply and reflect on the accumulated knowledge, experience
and feed back from trial and error search processes
Change of focus in the research process. Coincidence – often coined as
serendipity - plays a major role in industrial research (Rosenberg 1990). New
unintended opportunities often emerge in the research process, however as
observed by Stephan (1996) the following up is not accidental. It is in the interest
of the company that its researchers first recognize the potential when it emerge in
the research process and then decide to pursue those of the opportunities, which
seem most rewarding in the light of the company’s interests.
Disclosure of knowledge. Knowledge is only disclosed if somebody decides to
do so (Hicks 1995). When first new knowledge is articulated research
management can to certain extent decide to whom and on which conditions
knowledge should be disclosed. But it is the individual researcher who decides
when and how complete he wants to disclose his knowledge.
Access to external knowledge. The access to external knowledge is partly shaped
by individual decisions e.g. about what literature is important to monitor and
which personal contacts are established and maintained.
The challenge for research management is to influence the mentioned individual
decisions in order to increase the probability that they come up with and present
results in way useful for the company’s adaptations to its environment.
A well-known approach for management to communicate its interpretation of the
environment is setting goals without specifying which methods and approaches
should be applied in order to reach the goals. In an evolutionary perspective,
goals serve the purpose of supplying lower levels in the hierarchy with selection
criteria for guiding their own decisions about what to do. Goals enable
employees to ask themselves whether a given action or routine is in harmony
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with a given goal. As Simon (1959) puts it, goals create the grounds for the
decisions taken by others in the future.
Researchers make decisions on a continuos basis about what activities to take up,
what methods to apply, how to interpret the result in the research process etc.
Research goals could support all these individual decisions by providing the
researcher with guidelines for making their decisions. When the goals are very
clear, then research activities are clearly defined (Miner 1994 and Bossomworth
and Sage 1995) and individual goal tends to be compatible with the
organizational ones (Bland and Ruffin 1992).
The seeming inconsistency of setting goals for a research organization with the
need for individual autonomy is discussed in several studies from the early
1960s. The thorough investigation of freedom versus coordination found that
coordination of research groups towards shared goals was clearly compatible
with individual autonomy (Pelz and Andrew 1966). Their research showed that
both university and industrial researchers found themselves more productive
when their research was in general influenced by several external sources like
management and colleagues. Moreover, the researchers in the investigation
pointed out that they saw a positive correlation between external induced
boundaries for search and their own job satisfaction as long as the researchers
believed that they still had a high degree in autonomy. As illustration of their
conclusion the authors quote a scientist saying  “The organization points out
what mountain they want us to climb, but how we climb it is up to us”. Also,
Hagstrom (1965) supports the view of compatibility between goal-setting and
autonomy by arguing that autonomous researchers align individual goals with
organizational goals in order to reduce their uncertainty of not being recognized
for their effort. By following the organizational goal they secure a receptive
environment that will understand value their results and reward them
accordingly. Surprisingly, then the same pattern of individual caution towards the
needs of the hosting environment is expressed in situations with a very high level
of autonomy. Augsdorfer (1996) concludes based on a survey of bootlegging
activities in 65 industrial research laboratories that even when research activities
were hidden for management as bootlegging activities the output was not in
contrast to the overall strategy of the firm.
Besides focusing the attention of researchers research goals also increase
productivity in terms of produced papers and results. An extensive literature
review by Bland and Ruffin (1992) shows that several studies of research
productivity refer to clear goals that serve a coordinating function as having a
significant impact on research productivity. Pelz and Andrew (1966) deliver the
most significant support for this observation based on a survey including more
than 1300 researchers from both universities and industrial research. Their work
points out that high performance results from situations where the scientist had
both high influence on the research direction and high involvement from several
others e.g. through research goals, whereas complete autonomy and too tight
control both result in low performance.
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Setting goals in research differs from setting goals for other kind of corporate
activities on a number of dimensions.  First, the time span in research limits the
value of the corporate interpretation of its environment expressed in its goals for
guiding research. Research often produces results with implications for the
company at least 5-10 years ahead while for example corporate strategy holds a
more limited time perspective of around 2-3 years. This difference in time
perspective together with the inherent uncertainty in research in terms of when
results appear and which kind of value they might create, reduce the usability of
corporate goals as selection criteria for research.
Second, the ability of research to deliver unexpected outcome means that
possible future alternatives for adapting to the business environment are difficult
to anticipate on corporate level. In other words, top management does often not
possess the needed knowledge about what changes in the business environment
have significance for the firm’s future adaptability.
Third, the asymmetric distribution of knowledge between top-management and
company researchers implies furthermore that top-management does not possess
the needed knowledge for identifying the range of possible actions, which the
company is able to mount as a response to perceived changes in the environment.
As a consequence of these specific features of research as a corporate activity, it
is a core activity in research management to monitor and interpret the business
environment directly1 and to use this interpretation for creating and selecting
among alternatives (Mckelvey 1996). Corporate goals and strategy only serve as
a guideline for research management in the process of monitoring the business
environment.
However, due to the high level of uncertainty in research and the asymmetric
distribution of information (the individual researcher is supposed to know more
about his area than their managers), research managers often are in a situation
where they are not able to interpret and communicate their understanding of the
business environment in a way that alone can be used for guiding other people’s
decision making. Management can in such situations supplement goal setting by
creating and influencing shared company related cognitive frames.
Applying the concept of cognitive frames to research implies that research
management can influence and hence coordinate the decisions of individual
researchers by activity fostering and maintaining a shared cognitive frame among
the firm’s researchers. The benefit of this approach would be that research
management increases the likelihood for that autonomous researchers interpret
their environment in the light of the firms interest (as they are perceived by
management), and that they make decisions which are in line with the firm’s
interest and coordinated with the action of other researchers in the company.
                                                
1 Van Lente 1994 deals with how anticipations are created and shared in and between organizations. His
research shows that anticipations are socially constructed and serve the dual purpose of guiding the
actions of researchers and legitimize action.
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Cognitive frames emerge and change through the communication processes in
the social environment, which supplies individuals with tacit knowledge,
interpretation pattern and norms of behavior. Developing potentially self-
fulfilling prophecies appears to be an essential promotional strategy2 in science
and technology (Guice 1999). With empirical evidence from the field of
microelectronic Guice (1999) supports that trend-promotion plays an important
role in creating a shared vision of the future. According to Guice, trends are
especially important as guidelines for participants in high technology fields
because of the high level of competitive risk, interdependency and entrenchment
of particular technical approaches. Trends enable individual researchers who
subscribe to the trend, to feel confident that others will recognize the value of
their specialized research effort in the field.
Moreover, research management can use the internal selection process to
stimulate individual reinforcement processes by providing a clear feedback from
the selection process allowing individuals easier to identify what features of the
contributions have trigged a reward. Since the underlying process of creating and
diffusing cognitive frames can be considered as an evolutionary process, it will
also exploit the features of self-reinforcement. That cognitive frame, which
appears more suitable for leading to the right decision, will attract most attention
and be imitated more often than less successful cognitive frames.
The value of developing shared cognitive frames finds also evidence on
interorganizational level. Guice (1999) delivers empirical evidence that DARPA3
had a much more important function than only transferring funds by developing
networks of communication among research groups and organizations. The
agency staff continuously scanned various sources of information with the aim to
spot new promising but so far unexploited scientific areas for military use. The
information was used by managers to attract the attention of researchers by
creating communities, employing meetings, personal conversations, e-mail and
telephone calls. Guice’s (1999) observation leads to the conclusion that the core
of DARPA’s activities is communication among research organizations, group-
building and hereby promoting and pushing the creation of a shared conception
of future opportunities among researchers.
The risk by focusing on creating and maintaining a shared cognitive frame is that
one cognitive frame becomes highly dominant. As several authors have observed
one of the most common course of corporate failure is the lack of ability to
recognize the importance and value of other alternatives than the already known
ones. A uniform reaction pattern due to a well established shared cognitive frame
increases the risk of creating and maintaining core rigidities, despite diversity in
background and knowledge. An important managerial task is to continuously
                                                
2 According to Guice (1999), promotional arguments are the mirror image of scientific argument. They
put the relevance of the information to social context by exploiting an emotional rhetorical strategy to
promote general and inclusive claims. Because of its broader contextualization of the promotional
argument guides better the audience’s actions than the scientific argument.
3  The US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
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question whether the present way of interpreting changes and information from
the environment is the best way. Another risk is that researchers spend too much
time on gathering and evaluating information instead of doing research.
Conclusions
Creativity is not the only rationale for allowing a high degree of autonomy in
research. This paper argues that also other factors, such as complexity, rate of
change, uncertainty combined with an asymmetric distribution of knowledge
between research management and researchers justify a high degree of autonomy
in research.  The range decisions, which should be made autonomous, are
decisions related to the research process, change of direction in the process,
disclosure of knowledge and access to external knowledge. The other
consideration is that decisions in research often have a decisive influence on the
future of the company and depend on internal systemic mechanisms of the
company e.g. the actions of suppliers of complementary competencies. In other
words, companies need to maintain kind of influence on individual researchers in
order to develop their research activities in a long-term company perspective.
However, autonomy does not inevitably imply that individual research processes
and decisions should be beyond managerial influence. The paper proposes that
research management under these conditions should be considered as a process
of designing organizations as adaptive systems.
Evolutionary theory provides knowledge about the role of learning in
organizations’ adaptation processes and how these learning processes can be
influenced. The adaptation process of an organization to its environment is seen
as a consequence of adaptation in a hierarchy of internal learning processes. In
this framework individual adaptation is conscious goal-seeking guided by mental
models of the anticipated future development of the individual’s environment.
Management influences the individual learning processes by having impact on
the cognitive environment, communication and other parameters relevant for
individual adaptation.
An analytical framework for understanding how research management can
manage autonomous individual adaptation processes to increase the overall fit of
the company with it present and especially its future business environment,
includes following three issues:
1. Influencing individual decision-making
2. Selecting and rewarding among contributions and feedback from selection
3. Designing internal research environment
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Setting goals for research serves the double purpose of 1) focusing the research
and 2) increase the productivity of research. Goals both limit the variation and
increase the productivity as long as the goals are not too narrow defined but
define boundaries for what is interesting for the firm. Criteria to be used in
setting basic research goals and objectives are related to the following:
! Research management’s anticipation of the future business environment
directly. The anticipation reflects the corporate goal
! Should set the overall direction only
! Be in a form useful for individual decisions
Supplementary to goal-setting research management can influence the individual
adaptation process through influencing the cognitive frame that enables
individual researchers to monitor their environment. By creating and maintaining
the shared cognitive frame research management enables the company’s
researchers to coordinate and evaluate their actions in the light of the firm’s
interest. In this perspective, the primary role of management is to devise
processes for individual sense-making for the development and exercise of a
corporate imagination, and articulate new strategic logics for improving the
adaptive capabilities of individuals.
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